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Abstract
This paper discusses interactive minimum cost spanning tree problems and
argues that the standard approach of using a transferable utility game to come
up with a fair allocation of the total costs has some ﬂaws. A new model of
spillover games is presented, in which each player’s decision whether or not
to cooperate is properly taken into account.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, much attention has been paid to cooperative aspects of Operations
Research (OR) problems. When multiple players are involved in a particular OR
problem, they do not only face the task of optimising some objective function, they
also have to allocate the proceeds of cooperation in a fair way (see Borm et al.
(2001) for a survey). The current paper focuses on one such problem, the minimum
cost spanning tree (mcst) problem as introduced by Claus and Kleitman (1973). In
an mcst problem, players are located in the nodes of a graph with weighted edges
and the objective is to connect the players to some source as cheaply as possible.
The predominant paradigm for analysing cooperative OR situations is the model
of transferable utility (TU) games. Such a game assigns to each coalition of players
a worth, which represents the optimal total value (in an mcst problem, minimal
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1total costs) if the members of that coalition decide to cooperate. This game is then
subsequently used to assess whether an allocation rule (ie, a function assigning to
each instance of the problem a division of the total costs) is fair. The bargaining
problem to determine an allocation is not explicitly modelled, although some co-
operative solution concepts take this bargaining process implicitly into account (eg,
the bargaining set introduced by Aumann and Maschler (1964)). So, any strategic
consideration a player might have in such a cooperative situation is only up to a
point internalised in the allocation rule.
This paper deals with the most basic strategic consideration a player faces:
whether or not to cooperate. In an mcst problem, a player might have an incentive
not to cooperate, let other players connect themselves to the source and then free-
ride using the network that is already in place. In a TU setting, this phenomenon is
not taken into account and one simply assumes that all players have to get involved
in cooperation. In a TU game all coalitions get assigned a value that results from
cooperation. What happens to the players outside a particular coalition, however, is
not taken into account. The model we propose in this paper assigns not only a value
to each possible coalition, but also a vector of payoﬀs to the players who are not in
the coalition. This implies that each player can compare his (marginal) contribution
to a coalition with the payoﬀ he would get if he stays out of the coalition. In the
latter case he might be able to pick the fruits of cooperation by the players in the
coalition, without incurring the costs.
The literature oﬀers various cooperative models of the coalition formation pro-
cess, where each player’s decision whether to cooperate is (implicitly) taken into
account. One often applies the partition function form (cf Bloch (1996) and Ray
and Vohra (1999)). The model of partition function games, however, misses an in-
gredient that is crucial in our context: we do not only have a coalition of cooperating
players (possibly consisting of just a single player) and a group of non-cooperating
individuals outside, the cooperating coalition also plays a special role in that it
builds connections which other players can use.
To properly capture such a structure in which there is one coalition of players
cooperating and a group of non-cooperating players outside, we introduce the model
of spillover games. The spillover of a coalition to a particular outside player is the
payoﬀ (in either reward or cost) to this player if the coalition forms. In our context,
the spillover equals the minimum cost of the player connecting himself to the source,
given that the coalition has already done so.
2We argue that mcst solutions that seem fair in a TU setting (ie, that lie in the
core in the corresponding mcst game), might not be particularly appealing when one
takes spillovers into account. The aim of this paper is not to provide a full model
predicting what will happen in the allocation process, but to pinpoint an essential
shortcoming of the TU approach in this very primitive strategic setting and to show
that our model of spillover games goes some way to remedy these problems.
The main question that arises is whether it is still possible for the coalition of
all players to cooperate and ﬁnd an allocation of the total costs such that no player
has an incentive to leave the coalition and pay his spillover. We provide a charac-
terisation of when such an allocation, which we call spillover stable, exists in terms
of the underlying costs on the edges.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we brieﬂy outline the
mcst problem and deﬁne the corresponding spillover game. Section 3 discusses a
concavity property and show that this property is satisﬁed by mcst spillover games.
In Section 4, we discuss spillover stability and characterise the existence of spillover
stable allocations in mcst games. Section 5 provides some further applications of
the spillover model in other OR games.
2 Minimum cost spanning tree games and
spillovers
A minimum cost spanning tree (or mcst) problem (cf Claus and Kleitman (1973))
is a triple (N,∗,w), where N = {1,...,n} is a set of players, * is a source and
w : EN∗ → R+ is a nonnegative weight function, where N∗ = N ∪{∗}. ES is deﬁned
as the set of all edges between pairs of elements of S ⊂ N∗, so that (S,ES) is the
complete graph on S:
ES = {{i,j}|i,j ∈ S,i  = j}.
We assume that w satisﬁes the triangle inequality: w({i,j}) ≤ w({i,k})+w({k,j})
for all triples {i,j,k} ⊂ N∗.
With each mcst problem (N,∗,w) we associate a corresponding mcst game (N,c),
which is a transferable utility cost game, where c(∅) = 0 and for all S ⊂ N,S  = ∅,





w(e) |R ⊂ ES∗ and (S
∗,R) is a tree
)
.
The following example illustrates the concept of mcst problem and its corresponding
game.


































For coalition N, there are two optimal trees: T1 = {{∗,1},{1,2},{1,3}} and T2 =
{{∗,3},{3,1},{1,2}}, both having costs 5. The cheapest way for the players of
coalition {2,3} to connect themselves to the source without passing through player 1
is via the tree {{∗,3},{3,2}}, with costs 5. The mcst game is given in the following
table:
S ∅ {1} {2} {3} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3} N
c(S) 0 3 4 3 4 4 5 5
⊳
Bird (1976) proposed a class of solutions for mcst problems: given an mcst, each
player pays the costs of his unique adjacent link towards the source. So, the Bird so-
lutions for the problem in Example 2.1 are (3,1,1) (corresponding to T1) and (1,1,3)
(corresponding to T2). Each Bird solution lies in the core of the corresponding mcst

















Core elements are stable in the sense that if such an allocation for the grand coalition
is proposed, no subcoalition has an incentive to split oﬀ, build a tree of their own
connecting them to the source and be cheaper oﬀ.
4One aspect, however, is missing in the mcst game. One can always easily ﬁnd an
allocation that is stable against subgroups of players cooperating, but what about
the strategic consideration of players not to cooperate?
Consider the position of player 1 in Example 2.1. If the Bird allocation (3,1,1)
is proposed, player 1 can argue that this is unfair to him and not only because there
exist core elements that are more favourable to him. Suppose he withdraws from
cooperation and lets players 2 and 3 sort it out for themselves. If either of them (or
both) connects himself to the source, player 1 can free-ride and make his connection
cheaply with costs 1. So, why would he ever agree to cooperating and paying more
than 1?
In order to tackle these strategic considerations, we add an extra ingredient to the
mcst game: spillovers. In the context of mcst problems, the spillover of a coalition
S ⊂ N to a player i / ∈ S, denoted by zS
i , is deﬁned as the minimal costs of player i
connecting himself to the source, given that coalition S has already done so, so
z
S
i = min{w({i,j}) |j ∈ S
∗}.
The mcst game (N,c) and the spillovers z together constitute an mcst spillover
(cost) game (N,c,z). In the following example we illustrate this game for the mcst
problem in Example 2.1.
Example 2.2 Consider the mcst problem (N,∗,w) given in Example 2.1. The mcst
spillover game is given in the following table.
S ∅ {1} {2} {3} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3} N
c(S) 0 3 4 3 4 4 5 5
zS
1 3 1 1 1
zS
2 4 1 2 1
zS
3 3 1 2 1
Note that z∅
i simply equals c({i}), the cost of connecting player i directly to the
source. ⊳
We should point out that a spillover game is not a (special case of a) game in partition
function form (cf Myerson (1977)). In a game in partition function form, the value
of each coalition depends on how the players are partitioned into coalitions. Given
the discrete partition {{1},{2},{3}}, however, we do not know the coalition value
of {3} in Example 2.2. If coalition {3} connects itself, this value is 3, if coalition
5{1} builds the tree, the spillover of player 3 equals 1 and if coalition {2} connects
itself to the source, it equals 2. So, we do not only have a partition into a coalition
and remaining singletons, we also assign to one of these coalitions a special role.
Since this last ingredient is missing in the model of partition function form games,
spillover games cannot be embedded into that class.
3 Concavity
A transferable utility game (N,c) is called concave (cf Shapley (1971)) if
c(S ∪ U) − c(S) ≥ c(T ∪ U) − c(T) (3.1)
for all U ⊂ N, S ⊂ T ⊂ N\U. One of the interpretations of concavity is that if a
coalition S decides to join another coalition U, its extra costs are bigger than when
a larger coalition T decides to join U.
In our framework with spillovers, the expression c(S∪U)−c(S) does not represent
the additional costs if S decides to join U any more. For, if the players in S choose
not to join U, they cannot optimise and get their coalitional value c(S), but each
member i ∈ S has to pay his spillover zU
i . Hence, when spillovers are present, we
should adopt a new deﬁnition of concavity. A spillover game (N,c,z) is spillover
concave if











for all U ⊂ N, S ⊂ T ⊂ N\U.
Although not all transferable utility mcst games are concave, their spillover coun-
terparts are always spillover concave, as is shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1 All mcst spillover games are spillover concave.
Proof: Let (N,c,z) be an mcst spillover game. Let U ⊂ N, S ⊂ T ⊂ N\U. Then






because the right hand side equals the costs of a particular spanning tree for T ∪ U
(the optimal tree for S ∪ U extended with links from U ∪ {∗} to T\S), whereas
the left hand side equals the costs of the cheapest tree for T ∪ U. By substracting
P
i∈T zU
i from both sides, the assertion follows. ￿
6In transferable utility games, requiring (3.1) only for |U| = 1 is suﬃcient to ensure
concavity (cf Ichiishi (1981)). For spillover concavity, such a loosening of the con-
ditions leads to a (strictly) weaker property. However, spillover concavity can be
rewritten in terms of a submodularity property.
Proposition 3.2 A spillover game (N,c,z) is spillover concave if and only if











for all A,B ⊂ N.
Proof: For the “only if” part, assume that (N,c,z) is spillover concave. Let
A,B ⊂ N. Take S = A ∩ B, T = B and U = A\B. Then,
c(A ∪ B) = c(T ∪ U)






















For the “if” part, assume that (3.2) holds for all A,B ⊂ N. Let U ⊂ N,S ⊂ T ⊂
N\U. Take A = S ∪ U and B = T. Then,
























In a similar way as for concavity, we should revise the notion of subadditivity,
which for transferable utility games is deﬁned as c(S ∪ T) ≤ c(S) + c(T) for all
S,T ⊂ N,S ∩ T = ∅. The idea behind subadditivity is that it is better for a
coalition T to join coalition S than to stay separate. A spillover game (N,c,z) is
spillover subadditive if






for all S,T ⊂ N,S ∩ T = ∅. Using Proposition 3.2, it is readily seen that each
spillover concave game is spillover subadditive, so all mcst spillover games are
spillover subadditive.
74 Spillover stability
In this section we introduce the concept of spillover stability. Whereas a core allo-
cation (where we simply deﬁne C(c,z) = C(c)) is stable against a coalition splitting
oﬀ, a spillover stable allocation is stable against a player deciding not to cooperate.
If player i does not cooperate, he will have costs equal to zS
i for some coalition S. If
no coalition forms, he will have to pay z∅
i = w({i,∗}). For the moment we exclude
this possibility and assume that if i does not cooperate, a non-empty coalition will
always form and connect itself to the source.1












xi = c(N),s(c,z) ≤ x ≤ ¯ s(c,z)
)
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The spillover stable set is illustrated in the following two examples.
Example 4.1 Consider the mcst spillover game (N,c,z) in Example 2.2. The lower
and upper bounds for the spillover stable set are s(c,z) = (1,1,1) and ¯ s(c,z) =
(1,2,2), respectively. So,
S(c,z) = {(1,2,2)}.
Note that the Bird solutions, (3,1,1) and (1,1,3), are not spillover stable. ⊳
Example 4.2 Consider the mcst problem (N,∗,w) as described in the following
picture:
1As explained in the Introduction, our framework of assumptions on cooperation is not intended
as a full and realistic description of how players might behave in an mcst problem, but as a minimal


































The corresponding spillover game (N,c,z) is given by
S {1} {2} {3} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3} N
c(S) 3 5 6 5 6 7 7
zS
1 2 3 2
zS
2 2 2 2
zS
3 3 2 2
With s(c,z) = (2,2,2) and ¯ s(c,z) = (3,2,3) we have
S(c,z) = Conv{(3,2,2),(2,2,3)},
where Conv denotes the convex hull. The set of spillover stable allocations is a
subset of the core, which equals
C(c,z) = Conv{(3,2,2),(3,1,3),(0,1,6),(0,5,2)}.
The Bird solution, (3,2,2) is spillover stable, while the nucleolus of (N,c)
(cf Schmeidler (1969)), n(c) = (11
3,21
3,31
3), is not. ⊳
In order to explore the spillover stable set of an mcst game and its relation to the
core, we ﬁrst observe that a player’s spillover is monotonic in the coalition with
respect to which it is taken.




As a result of Lemma 4.1, in an mcst spillover game we have si(c,z) = z
N\{i}
i and
¯ si(c,z) = maxj∈N\{i} z
{j}
i for all i ∈ N. Note that the lower bound for i equals
the costs of the cheapest edge adjacent to i, whereas his upper bound equals the
minimum of the costs of his most expensive edge to another player and his direct
connection to the source.
9The following proposition characterises non-emptiness of the spillover stable set.



















i∈N minj∈N∗\{i} w({i,j}) ≤ c(N). Hence, there exists an x ∈ RN with
P
i∈N xi =
c(N) such that si(c,z) = z
N\{i}
i ≤ xi ≤ maxj∈N\{i} z
{j}
i = ¯ si(c,z) for all i ∈ N. ￿
We observed in Example 4.2 that even if each player’s most expensive edge is toward
the source, the resulting spillover game can still be spillover stable. However, Propo-
sition 4.2 states that the edges between the players must be suﬃciently expensive
compared to the edges to the source for a spillover stable allocation to exist.
Although core stability and spillover stability are based on diﬀerent ideas, for
three-player games spillover stability is a stronger property than core stability. This
is shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.3 Let (N,∗,w) be an mcst problem with |N| = 3 and let (N,c,z) be
the corresponding spillover game. Then S(c,z) ⊂ C(c,z).
Proof: Let x ∈ S(c,z). Then
P
i∈N xi = c(N). For all i ∈ N, xi ≤
maxj∈N\{i} z
{j}
i ≤ w({i,∗}) = c({i}). Also, xi ≥ z
N\{i}




j∈N xj −xi ≤ c(N) − z
N\{i}
i ≤ c(N\{i}), where the ﬁnal inequality
follows from the observation that c(N\{i}) + z
N\{i}
i equals the costs of a particular
spanning tree for the grand coalition. Hence,
P
i∈S xi ≤ c(S) for all S ⊂ N and
x ∈ C(c,z). ￿
In general, however, the spillover stable set is not a subset of the core and also the
reverse inclusion does not hold, as is shown in the following example.





















































































The upper and lower bounds for the spillover stable set are given by s(c,z) =
(1,1,5,5) and ¯ s(c,z) = (2,2,8,8). The spillover stable allocation (2,2,6,6) is not
an element of the core, because coalition {1,2} pays too much. On the other hand,
the core element (1,1,5,9) is not spillover stable because of player 4. The allocation
(1,1,7,7) is an element of the spillover core. ⊳
5 Further research
Minimum cost spanning tree problems are not the only class of OR problems in
which spillovers occur. A related phenomenon arises in travelling salesman problems
(Tamir (1989)). In a travelling salesman problem, there is a graph in which the
vertices represent the locations of the players (and the salesman) and the edges
represent the roads between them along which the salesman can travel, where each
edge has a nonnegative cost associated with it. The problem is to ﬁnd a cheapest
Hamiltonian circuit in this graph.
Also, each subcoalition faces the same problem of ﬁnding a cheapest Hamiltonian
circuit through the vertices in which the players in this coalition and the salesman
are located. This gives rise to a cooperative cost game. As is the case in minimum
cost spanning tree problems, however, one does not take into account that there are
spillovers involved. If a subcoalition of players decides to work together and invite
the salesman to travel to them according to their cheapest tour, the salesman might
come near some players outside the coalition, making it cheaper for them to have
him come to visit them as well.
In sequencing problems (cf. Curiel et al. (1989)), spillovers can also play a role. In
a sequencing problem, there is a queue of players waiting to be served. The players
in the queue might have diﬀerent opportunity costs, so moving high-cost players to
11the front while compensating the low-cost players through side payments can result
in a Pareto improvement.
Normally, in such situations, only pairs of players who are adjacent in the queue
are allowed to switch, so that a third player can never suﬀer. If we use our spillover
model, however, this restriction is unnecessary, since the eﬀect of any pairwise switch
on the other players can be taken into account explicitly.
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